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Abstract. This paper examines the interaction between intellectual property 
protection and competition policy on the choice of entrepreneurs with respect to 
commercialization  as  well  as  the  rate  of  innovation.  We  find  that  stronger 
intellectual  property  protection  makes  it  more  likely  that  entrepreneurs  will 
commercialize by cooperating with incumbents rather than competing with them. 
Consequently,  we  demonstrate  that  competition  policy  has  a  clearer  role  in 
promoting  a  higher  rate  of  innovation  in  that  event.  Hence,  we  identify  one 
reason  why  the  strength  of  the  two  policies  may  be  complements  from  the 
perspective of increasing the rate of entrepreneurial innovation.  
 
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: O31.
  
 





                                                 
* We acknowledge financial support from Torsten and Ragnar Söderberg’s Foundations and Tom Hedelius' 
and  Jan  Wallander's  Research  Foundations.  We  thank  Aron  Berg,  Pontus  Braunerhjelm,  Magnus 
Henrekson  and Gustaf Lundgren and participants in the June 2011 IFN/Swedish Entrepreneurship Forum 
Conference Entrepreneurship, Industrial Development and Growth for helpful comments and suggestions. 1.  Introduction 
Entrepreneurial innovations constitute a crucial ingredient in a well-functioning market 
economy. Scherer and Ross (1990), for instance, list a large number of break-through inventions 
made by independent innovators and state that “new entrants without a commitment to accept 
technologies  have  been  responsible  for  a  substantial  share  of  the  really  revolutionary  new 
industrial products and processes.” In addition, Baumol (2004) documents that in the US, small 
entrepreneurial  firms  have  created  a  large  share  of  break-through  inventions  whereas  large 
established firms have provided more routinized R&D. Further evidence of this is provided by 
Henkel  et  al.  (2010)  who  undertake  a  qualitative  empirical  study  of  the  electronic  design 
automation (EDA) industry, and find that small independent firms are, indeed, the providers of 
breakthrough inventions. 
We  focus  here  on  a  particular  aspect  of  entrepreneurship:  their  choice  of 
commercialization strategy. While many entrepreneurs take their innovations directly to market, 
others often sell their innovation (business) to incumbents. We observe a significant amount of 
inter-firm  technology  transfers,  ranging  from  joint  ventures  and  licensing  to  outright 
acquisitions  of  innovations.  These  acquisitions  might  occur  to  prevent  duplication  of  key 
complementary assets (Teece, 1987; Gans et al., 2002; Braunerhjelm and Svensson (2010)), to 
reduce  the  effects  of  competition  (Gans  and  Stern,  2000)  or  to  integrate  technologies. 
Granstrand  and  Sjölander  (1990)  present  evidence  from  Sweden,  and  Hall  (1990)  presents 
evidence from the US that firms acquire innovative targets to gain access to their technologies. 
Bloningen and Taylor (2000) find evidence from US high-tech industries of firms making a 
strategic choice between the acquisition of outside innovators and in-house R&D, Lerner and   2 
Merges (1998) note that acquisitions are an integral part of know-how transfers in the biotech 
industry, and OECD argues that established firms often acquire firms  to get access to new 
technologies. 
As  pointed  out  by  Gans  and  Stern  (2003,  2010)  and  Teece  (1987),  cooperative 
commercialization choices often rest on aspects of economic policy. They specifically point to 
intellectual property protection as being critical for allowing trade in ideas to occur.
12 Gans et 
al. (2002, 2008) confirmed the importance of this. However, there has been little discussion 
about the impact of competition policy on trade in ideas. Boone (2001) studies a model where 
an  independent  innovator  sells  an  innovation  to  an  oligopoly  market  incumbent  through 
bargaining.  He  derives  the  existence  of  a  non-monotonic  relation  between  intensity  of 
competition and the value of an innovation, indicating that there exists no easy prescription for 
competition authorities. Norbäck and Persson (2008) determine how antitrust policies affect the 
pattern of incentives for innovation for entry and innovation for sale. They show that a strict, 
but not too strict, merger policy tends to increase the incentives to innovate for sale by ensuring 
bidding  competition  for  the  innovation  (leading  to  a  greater  share  of  rents  accruing  to  the 
innovator), without reducing total rents for innovations too much.  
This  paper  examines  the  interaction  between  intellectual  property  protection  and 
competition policy on the choice of entrepreneurs with respect to commercialization as well as 
the  rate  of  innovation.  To  be  sure,  antitrust  policy  itself  can  be  a  barrier  to  cooperative 
agreements  –  especially  ones  motivated  by  the  maintenance  of  incumbent  market  power. 
                                                 
1 The tax system has also been shown to be of importance for commercialization mode by affecting the possibilities 
of loss offsets in case of project failures (Haufler, Norbäck and Persson [2012], the development of venture capital 
markets [Lerner and Tåg [2013], and entrepreneurial firms’ organizational form choices [Edmark and Gordon 
[2013]  
2 There is a literature examining  the length (how long should an inventor be granted exclusivity) and the breadth 
(what should be considered infringements) of a patent; here the research seems to motivate having patents that ar e 
limited in time but that are not too narrow (see Regibeau and Rockett [2007], and Schotmer [2005] for an overview 
of this literature).   3 
Because  these  matters  are  well  covered,  we  focus  here  on  the  more  nuanced  aspects  of 
competition policy – specifically, policies designed to protect entrants against preemptive use of 
incumbent market power (e.g., exclusionary customer contracts). Competition policy that favors 
entrants  over  incumbents  can  be  subtle  because,  in  some  circumstances,  entrants  expect  to 
become  a  future  incumbent.  Competition  policy  will  impact  on  the  rents  from  those 
expectations (Segal and Whinston, 2007; Gans, 2010). 
The existing economic literature focusing on entrepreneurial innovation has shown that 
intellectual property law, most notably patents, facilitates technology transfer between firms in 
the market for ideas and thereby increases the commercialization of entrepreneurial inventions 
(Arora,  1995;  Arora  et  al.,  2001;  Gans  et  al.  2002).  This  literature  also  examines  the 
determinants of patent licensing, the role of uncertainty in patent licensing, and the drivers of 
settlement in patent litigation (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1987; Gallini and Winter, 1985; Lanjouw 
and Lerner, 2001; Schankerman and Scotchmer, 2001). 
The paper proceeds as follows. First we review both IP law and competition law as it 
compares between the US and the EU. Second, we provide a model of the dynamic impacts of 
competition law (building upon the work of Gans, 2011, and the informal discussion in Gans, 
2010) on innovation/entrepreneurship, and compare the trade-offs in applying that law (notably 
its strength) as we move from an environment of competitive commercialization (associated 
with  weak  IP)  to  cooperative  commercialization  (associated  with  strong  IP).  We  provide 
reasons why we expect these policies to be complements, that is, as you strengthen IP policy 
you also want to adopt a stronger competition policy and vice versa. We do this from the 
perspective of targeting a higher rate of innovation rather than impacts on consumer welfare 
where the two policies are known to have substitutable effects. A final section concludes.   4 
2.  Legal Strength and Trends 
Here we review broad trends in the EU and US in terms of the strength of intellectual 
property and competition law. 
Intellectual Property Law 
The purpose of intellectual property law is to reward the innovation and creation of new 
technologies/ideas, and facilitate the spread of these through the granting of exclusive rights to 
utilize a new invention, new information or a cultural good. IP law is, typically, divided into 
patent, copyright law and trademarks, but we will here focus on patent law. The patent law 
offers inventors the right to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering for sale, or 
importing their invention for a number of years (often around 20 years). This law is uniquely 
powerful  in  IP  law,  enforceable  even  against  inventors  who  independently  create  the  same 
device. 
Intellectual property protection has  increased in both  the US  and  the  EU (including 
Sweden)  in  recent  decades.  According  to  EU  law,  a  patent  can  be  awarded  given  that  an 
invention  satisfies  certain criteria.  First,  the invention must be new,  i.e.,  you  cannot  patent 
something that is “publicly known” (e.g., through previous publications, presentations, or the 
use thereof), even though no one ever thought of patenting it. Second, the creation must have 
“height” (meaning that it must be sufficiently different from previously known techniques) and 
“industrial applicability” (in the sense that it could be used commercially), and that it must be a 
technical solution to a problem and solve this problem (Article 52 of the EPC).  
The United States has a longer tradition in IP law. US patent law was established “to 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries” as provided under   5 
Article 1, section 8(8), in the US Constitution. However, over time and especially with respect 
to Patent Law Reform in the US in 2011, the EU and US policies have become increasingly 
similar.  
In both jurisdictions significant strengthening has occurred. In the US, a new Federal 
Court of Appeals specializing in patents and other IPR matters was established in the 1980s and 
during its period of tenure the number of patents granted in the USA has increased at a rapid 
rate.
3 In the 1980s 61,819 Utility Patents were granted and as compared to 219,614 in 2010.
4 
The number of so-called EPO patents granted in the EU  increased from 34,702 in 2001 to 
58,108 in 2010. In Sweden, the number of patents granted has decreased from 2126 in 2000 to 
1379 in 2010. The decrease in Sweden is likely due to the increase in EPO patents granted to 
Swedish inventors. 
Competition Law 
The main motivation for the competition law is that it should prevent business strategies 
aiming  at  reducing  competition  in  the  market  too  much.  Typically,  the  competition  law  is 
divided  into  three  legs:  (i)  anti-monopolization  law,  which  prohibits  business  strategies  of 
dominating  firms  aiming  at  monopolizing  markets.  (ii)  anti-collusion  law,  which  aims  at 
preventing collusion that increases prices in the market, and (iii) merger control law, which 
aims at blocking mergers that lead to welfare reducing increases in the market power of firms.  
EU competition law has become increasingly strict, making it approach (if not even 
exceeding) the strength of its US counterpart, both in its scope of firm behavior controlled and 
its practice. The basic premise behind the EU competition law is that competition is a basic 
                                                 
3  See  Anderman  (2007).  On  September  16,  2011,  President  Barack  Obama  signed  into  law  the  Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act. This Act brought the most comprehensive overhaul to the US patent system since 1836. 
4 Source: U.S. Patent Statistics, Calendar Years 1963–2010, United States Patent and Trademark Office.   6 
mechanism  of  the  market  economy  and  encourages  companies  to  provide  consumers  the 
products they want at low prices.  
The  EU  competition  law  covers  two  prohibition  rules  set  out  in  the  Treaty  on  the 
Functioning of the European Union. First, agreements between two or more firms which restrict 
competition are prohibited (Article 101 of the Treaty), subject to some minor exceptions. This 
provision  covers  a  wide  variety  of  actions.  The  most  obvious  example  of  illegal  conduct 
infringing  Article  101  is  a  cartel  between  competitors  (which  may  involve  price-fixing  or 
market sharing). Second, firms in a dominant position may not abuse that position (Article 102 
of  the  Treaty).  This  is  for  example  the  case  for  predatory  pricing  aiming  at  eliminating 
competitors from the market. 
In  the  US,  Congress  passed  the  first  antitrust  law,  the  Sherman  Act,  in  1890  as  a 
“comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition 
as the rule of trade.” In 1914, Congress passed two additional antitrust laws: the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, which created the FTC (Federal Trade Commission), and the Clayton Act. 
With some revisions, these remain the core federal antitrust laws in effect today. 
The antitrust laws proscribe unlawful mergers and business practices in general terms, 
and leaves to courts to decide which ones are illegal on a case by case basis. The very first 
sentence  of  the  Sherman  Act  criminalizes  the  act  of  anti-competitive  behavior,  stating  that 
“[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce […] is declared to be illegal” (Title 15(1), §1), and in its second paragraph it 
outlaws even the attempt to monopolize a market: “[e]very person who shall monopolize, or 
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce […] shall be deemed guilty of a felony”.   7 
Long ago, the Supreme Court decided that the Sherman Act does not prohibit every 
restraint of trade, only those that are unreasonable. However, certain acts are considered so 
harmful to competition that they are almost always illegal. These include plain arrangements 
among competing individuals or businesses to fix prices, divide markets, or rig bids. These acts 
are per se violations of the Sherman Act; no defense or justification is allowed. The subsequent 
Federal Trade Commission Act from 1914 established the FTC, giving it the authority to “[…] 
prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations […] from using unfair methods of competition in 




The Clayton  Act  addresses  specific practices  that  the Sherman Act  does  not  clearly 
prohibit, such as mergers if the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to 
create a monopoly” (Title 15(1), §18). Over the last decades it seems clear that the strength of 
and scope of IPR has increased both in the US and EU. In the US, the total corporate fines 
imposed by the Department of Justice have increased from $271 million in 2001 to $339 million 
in 2010.
5  In the EU  cartel fines imposed by the  European Commission (adjusted for Court 
judgments) has increased from €3.2 billion in the period 2000–2004 to €8.9 billion in the period 
2005–2009.
6 
The interaction between Competition law and IP law 
According to Carrier (2009), the US courts refused to impose antitrust liability for patent 
based  activity  in  the  period  1890  to  1912.  However,  Congress  responded  to  the  courts’ 
ignorance  of  the  antitrust  concerns  in  patent  cases,  by  enacting  the  Clayton  Act,  which 
                                                 
5 Source: The United States Department of Justice, Antitrust Division 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/264101a.html (accessed 2011-09-27). 
6 Source: European Commission  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (accessed 2011-09-
27).   8 
prohibited  the  tying  of  patented  and  unpatented  products.  The  Courts  thereafter  began  to 
recognize antitrust restrictions on patentees (see e.g., Carbice Corp. of America v. American 
Patents  Development  Corp).  Beginning  in  the  1970s,  the  courts  retreated  from  the  overtly 
hostile approach to various IP arrangements. They began to follow a more economic-based 
approach, analyzing the competitive effects of arrangements (see, e.g., Continenta T.V., Inc. v. 
GTE Sylvania,  Inc.). This  process  has  continued, and  IP has  gained a strong position over 
antitrust in the US courts; a predominance maintained in the first decade of the 21
st century. 
EU  law  was  originally  quite  hostile  to  IPRs,  focusing  instead  on  encouraging 
competition. There has later been a shift towards the view that an IPR does not necessarily 
result in a monopoly that is harmful to competition. Even with that shift, however, the EU still 
tends to protect IP less than countries such as Japan or Australia (Anderman and Schmidt 2007, 
p. 37–38). In Parke Davis it was laid down that “higher sale price for a patented product…does 
not necessarily constitute an abuse” (Anderman and Schmidt 2007, p. 51). Still, EU law may 
not allow IP owners to charge the full value of the IPR as it is conceived by national law. That 
is, dominant firms may only charge a price that would give them a fair return. Refusal to grant 
license in primary markets, even under a dominant position or monopoly, is not prohibited by 
Article 82, but to acquire a competing innovative technology can be. Refusal to license in a 
secondary market may however violate the same article (82b). Buying out competition is not 
considered to be competition on the merits (Anderman and Schmidt 2007, pp. 52–57). When it 
comes  to  dealing  with  collusion  under  Article  81(3),  the  Commission  has  moved  from  a 
legalistic approach to a more economic approach (Anderman and Schmidt 2007, p. 84).  
In conclusion, we can see that, relative to the EU, the US places a greater weight on the 
strength of IP law relative Competition Law. That is, it protects incumbent innovators more than   9 
it protects entrepreneurial entrants. We will now examine the implications of this difference in a 
dynamic model of start-up commercialization choices. Our starting point is that a stricter IP law 
improves the opportunities of sale and licensing of inventions, and a more stringent competition 
law strengthens the position of entering innovators. 
3.  A Dynamic Model of Start-Up Commercialization Choices 
The basic set-up of this model follows Segal and Whinston (2007; hereafter SW), but 
with an important generalization. Whereas SW assume that a displaced incumbent becomes an 
innovating entrant with certainty, we allow for more competition amongst entrants engaged in 
innovative activity. In this model, it is no longer the case that a displaced incumbent becomes 
the innovating entrant with certainty. This becomes important when considering cooperative 
commercialization, as incumbents cannot be guaranteed the role of innovating entrant in the 
future.  
Firms and Innovations 
We  use  an  infinite  horizon,  discrete  time  model,  with  a  common  discount  rate  of 
 for all participants. Innovations occur sequentially with each innovation being a new 
product  that  yields  valuable quality advantages  over the previous  generation. The firm  that 
develops the innovation receives an infinitely lived patent; although the expected economic life 
of the product will be finite. At any given point in time there is one firm, the incumbent (I), 
which holds the patent rights to the current leading product or generation of products. Apart 
from the first period, the product generates a constant flow of monopoly rents,  , until it is 
displaced by a new innovation.  
We  follow  SW’s  assumption  that  the  current  incumbent  does  not  engage  in  R&D. 
[0,1] 
m   10 
Rather, it is an entrant’s R&D that leads to an innovation.
.7 This entrant is drawn from a pool of 
firms which is infinite in number and may include the previously displaced incumbent or, if 
there  is  no  such  displacement  as  a  cooperative  deal  is  negotiated,  the  previous  innovating 
entrant. The probability that a displaced incumbent becomes the next lead entrant innovator is
, while that probability is   for the prior entrant innovator if they have not become the 
incumbent. These probabilities may reflect dynamic capabilities that each firm has accumulated 
through its past activities as a producer (for the incumbent) or as an innovator (for the entrant).
8 
In each period, the entrant innovator, E, chooses its R&D intensity,   this is also 
the probability that it generates an innovation in the current period. Let the cost of R&D be 
denoted by  , where c(.) is an increasing, strictly convex function with  . In this set-
up,  an  entrant  has  an  incentive  to  engage  in  positive  R&D  effort  as  this  can  only  lead  to 
improved profits.  
Commercialization Choices 
When a new product is generated by an entrant in period t, the patent holder, E, faces a 
choice  in  that  period.  It  can  enter  into  production  of  the  product  generation  (we  call  this 
commercialization strategy “competition”) or it can negotiate with the current incumbent (we 
call this commercialization strategy “cooperation”).
9 Following the entrant’s decision, Nature 
decides which of the remaining firms that do not hold patent production rights to the current 
product generation and, thus, becomes the next entrant for research towards the next product 
                                                 
7 Gans (2011), considers a model whereby the current incumbent can also engage in R&D. There it is noted that 
such incumbents have an incentive to engage in a minimal level of R&D so as to slow down the arrival of the next 
innovation and avoid cannibalization of existing products. Thus, the assumption here can be considered as a natural 
one when incumbents have literally no incentive to expend resources on innovation.. 
8 The role of dynamic capabilities is addressed in more detail in Gans (2011). Here it is included so as to explore 
the robustness of the conclusions in SW and below to the pos sibility that current firms have imperfect chances of 
becoming future innovators in the industry. See also Sutton (2002). 
9 This is a common occurrence in innovative industries; see Teece (1987). 
I  E 
[0,1] 
() c  (0) 0 c   11 
generation. 
If E chooses to compete, I can no longer achieve monopoly profits in period t. Instead, I 
earns I and E earns E (where ). If the entrant competes, it incurs a fixed cost of f, 
which is sunk. We assume that such entry is credible; that is,  . The fact that the entrant 
incurs a fixed cost, but the incumbent does not, implies that incumbency is valuable. This plays 
a role in the nature of competitive dynamics. In period t+1, if the next entrant has not invented a 
product, E assumes the role of I and earns a profit flow of  until another entrant generates a 
new product. The previous incumbent then joins the pool of firms from which the next entrant 
will be selected. For simplicity, it is assumed that incumbent would have to sink costs, f, if it 
wished to re-enter the product market with a new future innovation. 
Alternatively, if E engages in cooperative commercialization it negotiates to sell I an 
exclusive license to its innovation.
 10 Alternatively, E could be acquired by I; however, as we 
explain below, this turns out to be a special case of licensing. We assume that such negotiations 
take the Nash  bargaining form  where the entrant  and the incumbent  have  equal  bargaining 
power, parameterized by .
11 If a licensing deal is successfully negotiated, E receives a once-off 
payment, , while I preserve its monopoly position. A licensing agreement allows the firms to 
avoid a competitive period in which only sub-monopoly profits can be earned, and allows E to 
avoid incurring any entry cost, f. If E chooses to cooperate, E is the one who returns to the pool 
of firms as a potential future entrant, while I remain the incumbent. 
                                                 
10 It is implicitly assumed that if E were to engage in non-exclusive licensing, the resulting on-going competition 
between the two firms in the product market would be so intense that entry would not be credible. Of course, 
licensing terms can be used as a tool to soften such competition. There is no need to consider this case separately, 
however, since exclusive licenses, which include terms that soften competition, and non-exclusive licenses would 
have the same impact on profit.  
11 In a non-cooperative bargaining model, Gans and Stern (2000) show that this outcome is the upper bound on the 
entrant’s bargaining power when IP protection is potentially weak and the incumbent can invest in “work around” 
technologies. 
I E m    
E f  
m   12 
Impact of Antitrust 
SW assume that profits under competition for both I and E and under monopoly may 
depend on policies of antitrust enforcement. They represent the strength of such policies by a 
parameter, , where higher values of   represent policies that are more protective of entrants. 
In other words, they assume that . In general, a policy that protects an entrant  in 
competition  will  not  favor  the  incumbent.  For  this  reason,  here  we  will  also  assume  that 
. Antitrust policies may also have an impact on monopoly profits, but it is not clear 
how, as the impact is likely to depend upon the specific nature of the policy. For instance, when 
incumbents  engage  in  costly  actions  in  an  attempt  to  prevent  future  entry  (e.g.,  exclusive 
contracting),  stand-alone  monopoly  profits  might  actually  be  higher  if  there  is  a  protective 
antitrust policy in place. In other situations such a policy might put a regulatory burden on 
incumbents and so a more restrictive policy could cause   to fall. As in SW, our primary 
interest is in the impact of a more restrictive policy on the rate of innovative activity amongst 
entrants. 
Competitive Commercialization 
To provide a point of comparison with SW, we begin with the case where licensing is 
not  possible.  In  the  infinite-horizon  dynamic  game,  following  SW,  we  confine  attention  to 
stationary  Markov  perfect  equilibria  using  SW’s  dynamic  programming  approach.  For  this 
purpose, let VI and VE be the expected present value of profits, at the beginning of any given 
period of an incumbent firm and an innovating entrant, respectively.
12 These values will satisfy: 
    (VE)  
                                                 
12 The remaining entrants in the pool earn an expected continuation value of zero and so need not be considered in 
deriving the equilibrium outcomes.  

( ) 0 E   
( ) 0 I   
m 
(1 ) ( ) ( ) E E E I V V f V c              13 
    (VI) 
Note that, following an entrant innovation, the entrant continues in the industry by default (as 
the incumbent) while the incumbent only continues in the industry as an innovating entrant with 
probability,  .  
For  an  entrant  innovator,  the  equilibrium  level  of  R&D  intensity  is  given  by  the 
following equation: 
   
Following SW, we let W denote the “innovation prize or benefit.” In this case, 
    (IB-Comp) 
so that an entrant is effectively solving in each period: 
    (IS) 
Since c(.) is convex, this gives an “innovation supply” relationship between the quantity of 
R&D () and its price (W). In each different case considered in this paper, the (IS) relationship 
will remain the same, but the value of W will change. Note that the convexity of R&D costs 
implies that  is non-decreasing in W. 
The equilibrium level of R&D by the entrant is determined by solving (VI) and (VE) 
simultaneously and using these equations to find the intersection of the (IB) and (IS) functions. 
The  (IB)  equation  describes  the  “innovation  benefit”  relationship  between  R&D  intensity 
(through  ) and the level of the innovation prize. Solving (VI) and (VE) simultaneously 
yields:  
   
(1 )( ) ( ) I m I I I E V V V            
I 
    [0,1] argmax ( ) ( ) E I E f V V c            
  E I E W f V V     
  [0,1] argmax ( ) Wc      
IE VV 
2 2 2
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Any level of R&D intensity that jointly satisfies (IS) and (IB) is a stationary equilibrium of the 
R&D  game.  Figure  1  depicts  a  possible  equilibrium  outcome.  The  equilibrium  rate  of 
innovation,  , occurs where the (IS) and (IB) curves intersect.
13 At this stage, it is useful to note 
that the equilibrium level of R&D will be non -decreasing in  , non-decreasing in  , non-
decreasing in   and non-increasing in f.
14 An increase in the first three parameters causes the 
IB curve to shift outwards while  an increase in f causes it to shift inwards. The IS curve is 
invariant to changes in these parameters. 
 
It is interesting to consider the intuition behind the comparative static results for  . The 
more likely it is that the incumbent will persist in the industry (by becoming the next lead 
                                                 
13 The IB curve may not be monotonic. SW demonstrate, however, that the same qualitative analysis holds for non-
monotonic functions. For this reason, we simplify the graphical exposition by depicting more familiar downward 
sloping case; for convenience, we have also drawn these curves as straight lines. 
14 This can be seen by taking the derivative of W in (IB-Comp) with respect to each variable and applying Theorem 
1 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994) on the corresponding set of equilibria. 
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entrant in the event that it is replaced by an entrant with a new innovation), the higher is  . As 
long as  , the higher the incumbent’s chances of reentering the market tomorrow is, the 
higher is the net present value of being the incumbent today. The value associated with being 
the lead entrant depends not only on the next period’s profit in which the entrant shares the 
market with the incumbent, but also the profit associated with playing the role of incumbent in 
any future period. Thus   is also increasing in  . In the event that the entrant produces a 
successful innovation, the incumbent will reenter the market as a lead entrant with probability 
, whereas the entrant will reenter with probability   − the entrant must first be overthrown 
by the current lead entrant. Thus, since the incumbent’s benefit from a higher value of   is 
more  immediate  and  more  likely,  an  increase  in    unambiguously  raises  the  incumbency 
advantage ( ) and hence the innovation benefit. 
This means that under competition, the more likely an incumbent is to innovate in the 
event that it is displaced, the higher the rate of innovation in the industry. On the whole, we 
would expect the incumbent to prefer a lower rate of innovation. If an increase in innovation 
intensity is a result of a rise in  , however, the incumbent benefits from this rise in innovation 
intensity. The cost to the incumbent associated with an increased probability of being displaced 
today is outweighed by the benefit associated with an increased probability of being the new 
entrant tomorrow. Indeed, if the incumbent were required to pay to reenter the pool of potential 
new entrants it would be willing to pay up to   for the option of future reentry into the 
market with probability,  . Since the entrant would be willing to make a similar payment (as it 
expects to become the incumbent one day), the entrant’s willingness to invest in innovation is 
even greater. Both of these effects add to the incumbent’s willingness to pay for  . 
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We  can  now  analyze  the  impact  of  antitrust  policy  ()  on  the  optimal  choice  of 
investment in R&D. As noted above, such policies do not shift the (IS) curve but will have an 
effect on the (IB) curve through their impact on the ‘innovation prize,’ W. Thus, the following 
proposition can be proved: 
Proposition 1. Under competitive commercialization, a stronger antitrust policy will increase 
the equilibrium rate of innovation if: 
. 
 
The proof of the proposition involves substituting the expressions for VI and VE above into (IB-
Comp) and taking the derivative with  respect  to  . The conditions under which a stronger 
antitrust policy leads to more innovation when incumbents become entrants with probability 
less than one, are identical to the conditions derived by SW under which a stronger antitrust 
policy  leads  to  more  innovation  when  displaced  incumbents  become  the  next  entrant  with 
certainty. Hence the impact of antitrust policies on the intensity of innovation is independent of 
. Thus, SW’s result also holds when displaced incumbents do not become entrants  with 
certainty. 
Intuitively, a more restrictive antitrust policy will have two effects on entrant innovation. 
First,  more  restrictive  antitrust  policy  directly  increases  the  entrant’s  immediate  post-entry 
profits. Second, a rise in  will indirectly reduce the value of being the lead entrant since it 
reduces the value the entrant receives from becoming the new incumbent (since the incumbent’s 
immediate post entry profits are decreasing in  , and the incumbent is subject to the same 
policy as the entrant). If the first effect outweighs the second, stronger antitrust policy will boost 
innovation.  Specifically,  antitrust  policy  is  most  effective  at  stimulating  greater  entrant 
innovation when the returns to such innovation are front-loaded in time. 
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Licensing and Cooperative Commercialization 
We now turn to consider licensing.
15 We will continue to assume that entry is credible, 
and  so  .  If  the  incumbent   negotiates  with  a  patent  holder,  the  incumbent  earns 
 , where  is the license fee; otherwise, the incumbent expects to earn   
(as  entry  occurs  and  incumbency  is  lost).  The  innovator  expects  to  earn    from 
licensing (as it may not persist in the industry) and   otherwise (as it becomes the 
incumbent with certainty).  
There will be gains to trade from licensing if: 
 
pm-t +dVI +t +s EdVE
Joint Payoff from Cooperation
³p I +s IdVE +pE - f +dVI
Joint Payoff from Competition
Þpm-(pI +pE - f )³ s I -s E ( )dVE
  (1) 
Note that cooperation avoids the dissipation of monopoly rents and the sunk costs of en try, 
() m I E f       . These are the same factors that drive the  gains from trade for licensing in 
static models (see Salant, 1984; Gans and Stern, 2000).  
In this dynamic model, however, there are additional forces that raise the joint surplus 
from licensing. First, a license agreement will allow the incumbent to preserve its  net present 
value and will preclude any other entrants from capturing this. As there is only one incumbency 
rent, this nets out as a gain from trade from licensing.  
When the incumbent and entrant cooperate, the probability that either party becomes the 
subsequent incumbent is  , the probability that the entrant remains the lead entrant in the next 
round.  When  they  compete,  however,  this  probability  is  .  Then,  if    licensing 
                                                 
15 As noted in the introduction, licensing is only one form of cooperative commercialization. It fits the formal 
model and so we focus upon it here; comments on how other forms of cooperation change the results, however, can 
be found in the concluding section. 
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increases joint surplus by  . If  , however, licensing can result in a fall in 
joint surplus of  . This might occur if the entrant has a more specialized focus on 
the current generation whereas the incumbent has capabilities that give it an R&D advantage in 
the next generation.  
Take the extreme case where   and  . By signing a licensing agreement, both 
parties lose the option to  be the lead  entrant  in the future.  If the agreement is  not  signed, 
however, the incumbent becomes the entrant in the following round, and so earns  . In 
effect,  the  licensing  agreement  confers  a  positive  externality  on  a  third  party  (a  potential 
entrant), which is internalized if no licensing agreement is reached. On the one hand, if the two 
parties compete the next entrant will necessarily be the incumbent. On the other hand, if they 
negotiate  a  license,  the  next  entrant  will  be  a  third  party.  So,  whenever 
, the overall gains from trade from licensing will not be positive and 
licensing will not occur. 
As  the  continuation  payoffs  are  endogenous,  care  must  be  taken  to  establish  the 
existence of equilibrium with licensing. Determining the conditions under which licensing will 
actually take place in equilibrium involves deriving the equilibrium value of continuation values 
under licensing; but this requires a solution for . Given this, we employ the Nash bargaining 
solution to determine the license fee. Assuming for the moment that the gains from trade are 
positive, let   denote the bargaining power of the entrant. Then the license fee, , is 
found by solving: 
    (2) 
This gives  .  
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In the licensing case, the (conjectured) equilibrium continuation payoffs are: 
    (VI)’ 
    (VE)’ 
Notice that, along the (conjectured) equilibrium path, incumbency involves a continual flow of 
monopoly profits (m) peppered by the payment of license fees to preserve technological (and 
market) leadership. In contrast, potential entrant returns are governed by the periodic earnings 
from license fees over the economic life of the patent. 
In this case, the innovation prize is:  
    (3) 
Thus, as in the case of competition, under cooperation the (IB) curve includes a factor based on 
the  value  of  incumbency;  through  ,  even  though  this  is  never  lost  in  (the  conjectured) 
equilibrium. Nevertheless, entrant innovators can still appropriate part of this in negotiations 
over the license fee.
16 The (IS) relationship remains the same as the no licensing case.  The 
resulting equilibrium continuation values are given in the appendix. 
We are now in a position to (partially) characterize the equilibrium outcome. 
Proposition 2. Licensing is an equilibrium outcome for  sufficiently small and/or  . 
Licensing is not an equilibrium outcome as  . 
 
The proof is given in the Appendix. The intuition behind this proposition can be understood by 
examining  (equation  1).  The  conditions  under  which  licensing  may  not  be  an  equilibrium 
outcome are addressed in more detail in Gans (2011). As the purpose of this paper is to analyze 
the impact of antitrust policy when licensing is an equilibrium outcome, in the remainder of the 
paper it will be assumed that  .  
                                                 
16 Of course, this would not be possible if product market entry were not credible. Note, however, that this does not 
require the innovator to exercise this entry option, merely to threaten it (see also Anton and Yao, 1994). 
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It is worth noting that the rate of innovation when licensing is an equilibrium outcome is 
higher than it would be if licensing were prohibited. The entrant only agrees to a licensing 
arrangement if its payoff under cooperation exceeds that under competition 
17  
The Impact of Antitrust Policy 
Having  set-up  a  licensing  equilibrium  as  a  variant  of  the  competitive  equilibrium 
established in the original SW model, the impact of stronger antitrust policy can be examined in 
further detail. The following proposition shows that like in the competitive equilibrium, under 
certain conditions, stronger antitrust policy will lead to greater innovation: 
Proposition 3. Under cooperative commercialization, a stronger antitrust policy will increase 
the equilibrium rate of innovation if: 
. 
 
The proof of this proposition is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. Unlike the competitive 
commercialization case, however, when   and licensing is expected, stronger antitrust 
policy  will  always  increase  the  equilibrium  rate  of  innovation,  since  antitrust  policy  both 
improves  the  entrant’s  profits  and  reduces  the  incumbent’s  profits  under  competition.  In 
contrast, the prize (which is determined primarily through the license fee paid to the entrant) 
depends on the weighted difference between E and I, rather than their sum. Since E never 
becomes the incumbent in a cooperative equilibrium, any increase in the license fee caused by a 
stronger antitrust policy is never a detriment to its research incentives. Hence, E strictly prefers 
stronger antitrust protection. 
That said, when  , stronger antitrust policy can dissipate the rents available to 
the incumbent, the gains from licensing, and hence the license fee that the entrant can extract 
                                                 
17  That  is,    which  always  holds  with  strict 
inequality except as  , in which case it holds with equality. 
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from  the  incumbent.  The  higher  the  level  of  entrant  bargaining  power  (),  the  greater  the 
entrant’s share of those rents and the greater the impact that a strict antitrust policy has on the 
innovation rate. When  , the condition under which stronger antitrust policy leads to more 
innovation becomes  . Thus, it is possible that stronger antitrust 
policy could reduce entrant innovation. If the discount factor is low or the impact on standalone 
monopoly  profits  are  large,  the  negative  role  that  the  policy  plays  on  monopoly  profits 
outweighs  the  gains  associated  with  entrant  innovation  so  that  antitrust  policy  hinders 
innovation. 
Acquisition 
Licensing is not the only form of cooperative commercialization. Another commonly 
practiced strategy involves the start-up being acquired by the incumbent firm. This may occur in 
situations where a licensing agreement or shift in intellectual property rights is infeasible. The 
difference between acquisition and licensing is that the start-up (or entrant, in this model) is 
removed from the pool of potential innovators for the next generation. In effect,  .  
It is readily apparent that, compared with licensing, there are lower gains from trade 
from  acquisition  as  the  externality  handed  to  third  party  potential  entrants  is  higher. 
Nonetheless, it is clear from Proposition 3 that the qualitative impact of antitrust policy is the 
same as in the licensing case, since the conditions under which tighter policies lead to more 
intense innovation do not depend on  .
18 
                                                 
18 Of course, the acquisition and licensing decisions themselves might, in richer environments, have impacts on the 
rate of innovation and on-going consumer welfare. Those issues are explored in Gans (2010). 
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4.  Long-Term (Exclusive) Contracts 
We now consider a key example addressed in SW to determine how (i) relaxing the 
assumption that displaced incumbents become the innovating firm in the following period, and 
(ii) how allowing entrants and incumbents the opportunity to cooperate, changes our predictions 
about certain findings. 
SW consider a model in which the incumbent can sign long-term exclusive contracts 
with all or some of its current customer base. They use a quality ladder model in which the 
customer base lies on the unit interval and each product innovation raises each consumer’s 
utility  by  a  fixed  quantity,  .  In  the  absence  of  exclusive  contracts,  the  focal  Bertrand 
competitive  equilibrium  is  that    and  .  They  compare  this  to  the  case  in 
which the incumbent offers an exclusive contract to a share of its consumers, B, in the form of a 
fixed price for delivery of their product in the next period. Contracts can only be written at most 
one period in advance. 
If a consumer is offered an exclusive contract at a price of  , the only risk they face in 
accepting the contract is the possibility that the entrant innovates in the current period. In the 
event that the current entrant innovates, the consumer forgoing a potential gain in utility, and 
thus,  their  expected  opportunity  cost  is  .  Thus,  the  consumer  only  accepts  a  long-term 
exclusive  contract  if  ;  that  is,  the  benefit  associated  with  the  improved 
technology, discounted by an amount that reflects the fact that with probability   the consumer 
could have purchased a product of equal quality from the new entrant. Offering this contract 
costs the incumbent  , multiplied by the probability that the entrant does not innovate. 
Nonetheless, SW demonstrate that the incumbent will sign exclusive contracts with as many 
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consumers as possible, within the bounds of antitrust law (antitrust restrictions are modeled 
using the parameter  , defined as the permissible share of consumers who can receive long-
term exclusive contracts; due to its negative impact on entrant R&D rates). When the incumbent 
can  offer  exclusive  contracts  to  existing  customers  profits  are  given  by 
,   and  . Plugging these into the condition 
in Proposition 1, it is clear that stronger antitrust policy leads to more innovation in this model. 
When cooperative deals can be struck, the analysis of long-term exclusive contracts 
becomes  (surprisingly)  more  straightforward,  and  the  impact  of  antitrust  policy  becomes 
unambiguous.  When  the  entrant  is  expected  to  license  to  the  incumbent,  the  incumbent’s 
product quality increases by . Suppose that this event means that the two generations of old 
technology  become  publicly  available.  Thus,  the  incumbent  monopolist  can  charge  non-
contracted consumers 2.
19 The question is: what price can the incumbent charge consumers for 
a contract covering the product in the next period? Assume that this product  will always be the 
latest generation in the incumbent’s hands (either its current or the next generation should the 
entrant innovate and license to the incumbent). While under competitive commercialization, the 
incumbent had to offer those contracts at a discount due to the potential competition coming 
from  the  entrant,  when  consumers  expect  the  entrant  to  license  to  the  incumbent,  no  such 
competition will be forthcoming. Hence, the incumbent could offer a modest, arbitrarily small 
discount to consumers for exclusive contracts that they would all accept. As the cost of doing so 
is minimal, the incumbent will offer such contracts up to the antitrust constraint,  . 
In this situation, profits are given by  ,  , and  . Thus, the 
antitrust constraint does not impact on standalone monopoly profits. Plugging these into the 
                                                 
19 Strictly speaking the argument will hold so long as there are a fixed number of product generations held by the 
incumbent at any period of time. 
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condition in Proposition 3, it becomes clear that the stricter the antitrust policy, the more intense 
innovation will be. Intuitively, a ban on exclusive contracts improves the entrant’s prospects 
under competition – there is a redistribution of rents from the incumbent to the entrant of an 
amount 2 per additional non-contracted or ‘free’ consumer. This is built into the license fee 
and thereby increases the innovation price. There is, therefore, arguably a stronger motivation 
for a ban on exclusive contracts  that lock in  consumer to  the incumbent  when cooperative 
commercialization is expected than in the competitive case. 
5.  Conclusion 
This is the first paper to consider the choice of start-up commercialization strategy in a 
dynamic environment. It was demonstrated that the impact of dynamic considerations upon this 
decision is not captured by a purely static focus. In particular, the on-going roles of the parties 
of a licensing deal matter in terms of rent capture and the returns to licensing over competition. 
In turn, these on-going roles are related to dynamic capabilities – that is, the probability that a 
firm will have an innovative advantage in R&D towards the product generation based on its 
current role (as entrant or incumbent). These capabilities feed-back to determine the general 
relationship  between  commercialization  activities  of  start-ups  and  their  share  of  innovation 
across industries. 
We  show  that  stronger  intellectual  property  protection  makes  it  more  likely  that 
entrepreneurs will commercialize by cooperating rather than competing. Competition policy has 
then a more important role in promoting a higher rate of innovation by protecting entrants from 
incumbents’ bargaining power in their cooperative arrangement. Hence, we identify one reason 
why the strength of the two policies may be complements from the perspective of increasing the   25 
rate of entrepreneurial innovation.  
Given  that  in  the  balance  between  IP  law  and  competition  law,  the  US  put  more 
emphasis on IP law than the EU, and that US competition law is built more on rule of reason 
than per se rules (as is the case with EU merger law), this may indicate that US law encourages 
cooperative commercialization more than EU law.  
Our finding that the strength of intellectual property protection law and competition law 
may be complements from the perspective of increasing the rate of entrepreneurial innovation, 
thus indicates that the strong position of competition law in the US and the strengthening of the 
US  intellectual  property  protection  law  over  the  last  decades  may  explain  the  strong 
productivity growth in the US of the last decades. The recent joint strengthening of competition 
law and intellectual property protection law in the EU might indicate that such a productivity 
increase may also occur in the EU over the coming decades if this development continues. 
However,  our  analysis  also  shows  that  the  devil  is  in  the  details  and  more  general 
conclusions  are  difficult  to  obtain  due  to  the  intricate  interaction  between  IP  law  and 
competition law, and their effect on the incentive to innovate. Thus, more in-depth research 
seems highly warranted on this topic.   26 
Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Using the values computed above, substituting them into (1), and taking the limit as  
approaches 0, we get  . Also, looking at (1), if  , the same value 
arises. So licensing is an equilibrium in either case. 
 
For the possibility that licensing is not an equilibrium, note that for   and  , 
taking the limit as  approaches 1, the gains from trade become: 
    (4) 
We  wish  to  show  that  this  is  negative.  Suppose  that  it  is  not.  Re-arranging  we  have: 
. Note that, as  ,  . At  , this implies that 
, which, as c(.) is non-decreasing with c(0) = 0, can only be true if   (as 
this is the point where average cost equals marginal cost). Thus, in equilibrium, (4) cannot be 
positive and so licensing is not an equilibrium outcome in this case. 
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